INTRODUCTION
In 2000 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) to guide the US Department of Defense (DOD) in the next century.
1 JV 2020 calls for a transformation of US Armed Forces to achieve full spectrum dominance in peace and war.
2 Precision engagement is a critical capability in this plan for full spectrum dominance. 3 JV 2020 defines the characteristics of precision engagement as, "the linking of sensors, delivery systems, and effects," and predicts that precision capability will be linked across services in the future. 4 If fully implemented, JV 2020 will create US Armed Forces that are technically fully joint, and capable of precision engagement.
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The weapons necessary for precision engagement are referred to as precision weapons.
Currently the US has four types of precision weapons. These weapons are defined by their terminal guidance systems and include; man in the loop, Global Positioning System (GPS) aided, anti-emitter, and smart submunitions. 6 As of 2001, most of the US' precision engagement capability comes from laser-guided "man in the loop" weapons carried on fighters/attack helicopters. 7 Very few US ground forces and some combat aircraft do not have any laser-guided precision weapons. 8 If the DOD is committed to JV 2020, it must find innovative ways to provide a precision engagement capability to all US forces. Since laser systems already provide most of the DOD's precision capability, the innovation should start with lasers.
According to JV 2020, innovation can occur, "from fielding new things, or by imaginatively This research contains six sections. Following the Introduction, Section II, Background, describes current US laser systems, laser guided weapons, and joint interoperability with respect to laser systems. Section III, Proposal, defines Joint Laser Interoperability. Section IV, Analysis, describes the operational advantages Joint Laser Interoperability could provide the DOD and how it could enhance current precision engagement capabilities. Section V, Limitations, contains a discussion of the limitations of weather on laser systems, as well as potential roadblocks in the areas of communications and doctrine. Section VI is titled, Conclusion.
SECTION II

BACKGROUND
Current US Laser Systems
This section provides a basic outline of current laser systems and how these systems could be changed to increase US precision engagement capability. Lasers and laser-guided weapons are not new to the inventory. In 1972 USAF fighters ushered the world into the age of precision engagement by destroying North Vietnam's Paul Doumer Bridge with laser-guided bombs.
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Since the Vietnam War, every branch of the US Armed Forces created their own niche for laser systems. These laser systems fall into the four basic categories of; laser range finders, laser designators, laser spot trackers, and laser guided weapons. The following paragraphs provide a layman's description of these categories, as well as a description of eye-safe versus non eye-safe lasers. Each category includes the DOD's current uses of each laser system. The four categories 8 Ibid, do not include lasers as a weapon (i.e. laser beams blowing things up), as it is outside the scope of this research. After looking at each services' existing laser systems, the section points out the systems that currently operate in a joint environment, and the systems that cannot.
Laser Range Finders
Laser range finders were the first military application of the laser as a tool of war. The US military developed these range finders less than five years after Theodore Maiman built the first working laser. 11 First used on tanks in the 1960s, laser range finders are now a necessary part of most direct fire targeting systems in the DOD. 12 The following is a basic description of how a laser range finder works, what platforms they are currently mounted on, and the difference between eye-safe and non eye-safe lasers.
A laser range finder has two basic parts, the laser and a laser receiver. When a laser is fired, the object it hits, or its target, reflects the laser energy and this energy disperses. Some of this energy is reflected back towards the laser and can be picked up by the receiver. A laser range finder fires a 10 to 30 nanosecond (billionth of a second) burst of laser energy at a target in a preset wavelength and the laser receiver is coded to pick up only the reflected laser energy in that same preset wavelength. 13 Laser energy travels at the speed of light, roughly 180,000 miles or 300 million meters per second. 14 The laser receiver has a small processor that knows the speed of light and using the rate=time x distance formula, the receiver solves for distance. Laser range finders are extremely accurate and incredibly fast.
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This quick and accurate range information greatly increases the chance of a first round hit for modern military weapons. Thus, tanks, anti aircraft guns, anti tank guns, direct fire weapons, and 10 George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War (New York, Crown Publishers Inc., 1996) many ship and aircraft weapons rely on lasers for range information. 16 As previously stated, laser range finders are a part of most current US fire control systems. These range finders are built into tanks, armored personnel carriers, attack and reconnaissance helicopters, fighter and bomber aircraft, ship fire control systems, and even hand carried by soldiers. Table 2 -1 below gives an overview of the many types of LRF systems currently used by the US military. The designator column denotes those range finders that are also laser designators, and will be discussed later. 
Laser Designators
A laser designator is a laser range finder with enhanced capabilities. In addition to the normal functions of a laser range finder, laser designators can be used to guide a laser-guided weapon to a target. For laser designation operations, an operator shines his laser on a target during the terminal phase (last seconds) of the laser-guided weapon's flight and the weapon guides on the laser energy reflected off of the target.
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To insure the weapon hits the correct target, the laser is coded and the seeker on the weapon must have the same code set. 24 This code can be described as sort of a Morse code, with the split second laser burst sending dot-dash-dot, and the weapon set to the same code. The weapon will not see any laser that is not transmitting the dot-dash-dot code. Since each weapon has it's own separate code, multiple lasers and weapons can be fired into the same area without fear of interference or the weapon switching to the wrong target.
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Coding provides flexibility because the designator can be on the ground or in the air and does not have to be co-located with the system that launches the laser guided weapon. Thus, a soldier with a designator can laze for artillery, helicopter, or aircraft delivered laser guided weapons and fixed or rotary wing aircraft can laze for the same systems. When coupled with the many laser systems and weapons on a battlefield, this flexibility provides an almost endless number of ground to ground and air to ground lazing and weapons delivery options. Procedures for these tactics are located in Joint Pub 3-09. 
Laser Spot Trackers
Laser Spot Trackers are the least common of all US laser systems. A laser spot tracker is not a laser, it is a sensor that picks up coded laser energy from a laser designator and projects a symbol on a sight or heads up display. This symbol allows an operator to visually acquire the target designated by his or a friendly laser. Most laser spot trackers are mounted on helicopters or fixed wing aircraft.
27 Table 2 Table 2 -3 lists the current laser guided weapons in the US inventory along with the platforms that deliver these weapons. Some systems have range finders but no designators, while others have laser spot trackers and no lasers. While the reader might expect interoperability at least within a specific service such as the USAF, a review of the table 2-1/2 shows that the primary Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft, the A-10 does not have a laser but is equipped with a laser spot tracker. Conversely, the F-16 has a laser designator, but no laser spot tracker.
With the exception of jointly acquired systems such as the LANTIRN pod, inter service interoperability is just as confusing. Table 2 -1 shows that tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) are equipped with laser range finders that cannot be coded, and thus could not designate or mark for their own service helicopters or sister service fixed wing aircraft. Further, these platforms equipped with strictly range finding assets can not designate for the Copperhead munitions available from their own or sister service artillery. Simply put, current US laser system capabilities are not interoperable. To create the fully joint precision engagement capability called for in JV 2020, the US must make significant changes.
SECTION III
PROPOSAL
As previously stated, almost all precision weapons in the US inventory are controlled by laser systems, and these laser-guided weapons have been the weapon of choice in recent conflicts. As an example, during Operation Deliberate Force over Bosnia, the US employed a total of 622 precision munitions, of which 567, or 91% were laser-guided bombs.
36 If the US could make all laser systems and laser guided weapons jointly interoperable, then logically, the DOD would be well on the way towards achieving JV 2020's goal of a fully joint precision engagement capability. Significant changes must occur before Joint Laser Interoperability is a reality, tanks, APCs and aircraft will cost money, even if the majority of these capabilities are already on the shelf. Due to current contracting laws, vendors are prohibited from giving actual costs to DOD members who are not involved in the acquisition process. Sadly, this includes Senior Service Students who are doing research. Since costs are not available, this paper focuses on capabilities, and deals with costs only as a matter of common sense.
Air Interoperability
Laser systems are more common to aviation units than any other segment of the armed forces. A review of the tables in Section II shows that all fixed wing fighters and most helicopters can employ laser guided weapons, yet there is great disparity when it comes to laser designators and trackers. Some aircraft have designators and some do not. Fewer still have a laser spot tracker so the operator can see where his laser spot or the spot of another designator is pointed. Though the idea of adding lasers to UAVs is so new it is not included in Joint Pub 3-09.1, UAV laser testing is moving at a fast pace. Recently a UAV shot a Hellifre missile at a tank and guided it to a direct hit with its own laser 39 . To achieve laser interoperability within the air component, this concept breaks the component into fixed wing, rotary wing, and UAV assets, and proposes changes for each asset class.
This paper defines fixed wing assets as fighter and attack aircraft, and does not include the B- Litening II as soon as possible would provide interoperability for these aircraft. 41 The A-10 attack aircraft does not carry a targeting pod, however, the Marines began mounting the Litening II on AV-8Bs in August 2000. 42 In the case of the A-10, the author proposes the aircraft be modified to carry a targeting pod and then be equipped with the Litening II.
In 2008 the first Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) will enter the US inventory. JSF aircraft will eventually replace many of the fighters mentioned above, including the A-10, AV-8B, F-16 and F-18 A and C models. 43 The JSF will have a laser spot tracker and laser designator, and combat and training laser modes, making it fully laser interoperable.
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Attack helicopters make up the rotary wing portion of the air component. A review of the tables in Section II shows that the Marine AH-1, and the Army Apache, OH-58, and MH-60 have laser designators. The Navy's SH-60 is also laser designator equipped. Unfortunately, all of these helicopter mounted laser designators have a fixed wavelength of 1.06 microns and none of them have a true eye-safe training capability. 45 . The author proposes the DOD modify attack helicopter laser designators with a selectable wavelength of 1.06 for combat and 1.54 for training.
The "switchable eyesafe laser rangefinder/designator" (SELD) designed by Kollsman Inc. for the Comanche helicopter is an on the shelf solution for this problem.
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As for laser spot trackers, the Army OH-6 has a tracker and no designator, and the OH-58, 48 In the case of the OH-6, its small size might make the addition of a laser designator unrealistic, however, the current laser spot tracker should be modified to see both 1.06 and 1.54
microns.
The only modification the Apache requires is a change to its laser spot tracker to pick up the 1.54 micron training wavelength. The US Army's next generation attack helicopter is the AH-66
Comanche and it will be equipped with a 1.06/1.54 laser designator and a laser spot tracker.
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When fielded, the Comanche will meet all of the requirements of Joint Laser Interoperability.
UAVs are the newest air asset in the US inventory. Future UAVS should be equipped with a dual wavelength combat/training laser designator and a laser spot tracker that picks up both wavelengths. In addition, these laser systems should be tied into the UAV navigation system similar to the way the LANTIRN and Litening II pods slave to the GPS. 52 Tying the laser designator to the navigation system allows the UAV to mark targets with the laser and provide extremely accurate coordinates to the units it supports.
Ground Interoperability
Because US Army and Marine units are each organized differently, the author uses a generic When a force is Joint Laser Interoperable, the first friendly to detect and identify a hostile target can; kill the target, provide laser guidance for an off board LGW equipped system to kill it, or positively pass the target to another laser equipped system that has the capability to kill it. The real beauty of laser interoperability comes from this real time, speed of light, ability to pass targets accurately from one platform to another. With joint interoperability the options between systems are almost limitless, however, it is important to provide an example here so the reader can understand the concept.
Using an A-10 Forward Air Controller (FAC-A) and an M-1A1 tank as examples, with laser interoperability here is how the A-10 might pass an enemy target to the M-1A1 using a "lazespot -laze -confirm" technique. After verification that he was communicating to the friendly tank, either through secure communications or an authenticator card, the A-10 would tell the tank commander to slew his turret to a specific heading, or provide the target grid coordinates. The A-10 would pass the M-1 the four digit laser code, and the M-1 would load this code into his laser spot tracker and laser designator. The A-10 would then transmit "laser-on" and the M-1 would immediately see a symbol over the enemy tank in his gun sight. To confirm it is the correct target, the M-1 would transmit, "confirm laser" and the A-10 would see a symbol over the tank in his targeting pod. If the A-10's laser spot tracker symbol was not on the enemy tank, the A-10 could abort the M-1 before he fired.
The laze, spot, laze, confirm, communication technique is quick, and the laser's pinpoint accuracy leaves little room for error. The entire process could have been done just as easily if the M-1, or another friendly vehicle was passing the target to the A-10. Because the first friendly who sees the enemy keeps track of it until he kills it or passes it off, the enemy stays engaged from first sighting until it is destroyed.
Deep Operations
Since Operation Desert Storm the US has been committed to the concept of precision engagement. Nightly news clips of laser guided bombs hitting targets in Iraq or Kosovo provided visual evidence of the lethality of precision munitions. This highly publicized precision warfare often creates a misconception with both the public and the military that all enemy targets can be destroyed at will with a laser-guided bomb.
In a recent Rand study on deep operations, precision weapons received high marks against fixed targets such as electrical power, bridges, and POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) sites.
Conversely, precision weapons did not fare well against moving armor, and small and mobile targets. 84 If the US wants to meet JV 2020's goal of precision engagement across the full spectrum of warfare, the DOD must achieve the same level of precision success with small and mobile targets that it has with large fixed targets.
During Operation Desert Storm deep operations focused primarily on enemy "centers of gravity". 85 In Iraq most centers of gravity were fixed targets that fell into the Rand target sets where LGWs excel. 86 In the more recent Kosovo conflict US forces directed much of their effort against the enemy's fielded forces. These forces were made up of the type of targets the Rand study identified as "difficult to destroy with precision weapons" (i.e. moving armor and small and mobile targets). as the center of gravity, US forces will be tasked to operate and succeed in that scenario. Because JV 2020 directs dominance in the "full spectrum," US forces need the ability to precisely engage all targets whether big or small, fixed or mobile.
After Kosovo the US did not publish a DOD wide lessons learned. Unlike the US, the United Kingdom quickly published an after action report with specific references to precision weapons. This report stated, "There is a need for the UK and its allies to improve capabilities in the following areas: precision joint all-weather attack capability against both static and mobile ground targets."
89 Both the Rand study and the UK lessons learned call for an increased deep strike capability against small and mobile targets. It is not illogical to assume that actions that increase US precision capabilities against these small targets will increase precision capability against the large fixed targets the US has successfully hit since Desert Storm. Joint Laser
Interoperability can provide a significant increase in capability against small and mobile targets in deep operations, while at the same time, maintaining the ability to target and destroy large fixed targets.
Laser interoperability would save time, minimize exposure to enemy threat systems, allow a positive handoff of previously identified enemy targets, limit collateral damage, and increase the probability of a kill. This section uses Kosovo as an example to focus the deep operations discussion on small and mobile targets. It covers air operations first followed by examples of how sea and ground forces could use laser interoperability to significantly increase their precision engagement capability.
Deep air operations require large amounts of intelligence support both to find the targets and to provide planning materials for use during the mission. In the case of "man in the loop" Scouts whose responsibility it was to visually confirm the target as an enemy and then talk friendly aircraft onto that target.
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Often it takes the FAC-A or Killer Scout some amount of time to get his eyes on the target during which he is orbiting in a hostile threat environment. To limit confusion over the terms FAC-A and Killer Scout, a FAC-A can control air in close proximity to friendly troops or Close Air Support (CAS) missions. A Killer Scout can only control air on the enemy side of the FSCL, and is not trained to control in close proximity to friendly troops. In deep operations the two missions are essentially the same, and for the remainder of the deep operations discussion only the term FAC-A will be used.
During some missions over Kosovo, UAV operators had already identified small or mobile targets as hostile before the FAC-A came on scene, and were able describe where the targets were located or "talk the FAC-As eyes onto the target" after he arrived. laser telephone.
In the above scenario, a laser interoperable UAV could pass the target coordinates and UAV laser code to ABCCC or JSTARS who would pass the information on to the FAC-A. When the FAC-A arrived in the target area the UAV would begin the laze, spot, laze, confirm technique.
With his targeting pod looking at the coordinates he already had from the UAV, the FAC-A could immediately pick up the UAVs laser spot, mark the target with his inertial navigation system, and then laze the target for the UAV to confirm it is the correct one. Here the UAV is the first friendly to find the target and the operator holds on to it until he positively passes it off.
Rather than a lengthy dialogue where the UAV operator describes the terrain that he sees and tried to talk the FAC-As eyes onto the target, the FAC-A picks up the target when the UAV's laser puts a symbol in his targeting pod. This time saving process now takes seconds rather than minutes, minimizing the time in unfriendly airspace as well as preventing a mobile target from moving before the FAC-A can locate it. When all fighters have Joint Laser Interoperability, the FAC-A or Killer Scout aircraft uses the same laze, spot, laze, confirm technique to positively pass the target to the fighters working his area. These laser interoperable fighters could then use their
LGWs to destroy the target, increasing the chance of a kill and decreasing the chance of collateral damage due to the weapon's accuracy and the decreased probability of target mis-identification.
If the FAC-A is working the area without the assistance of a UAV, he uses Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), binoculars, Ground Moving Target Radar (GMT), coordinates from JSTARS, his targeting pod, or his eyes to find and confirm targets. 96 Once he has these targets identified he can use his laser to quickly pass them to friendly fighters, and confirm those fighters are looking at the correct target with his laser spot tracker.
In the future, pilots could talk directly to a UAV operator in the same way as he worked with a FAC-A. During periods when weather or enemy air defenses prevent FAC-As from operating The advantages laser interoperability offers in deep operations cannot be understated.
Providing this capability to all delivery platforms would significantly increase a platform's probability of kill while at the same time, lessen the threat of collateral damage. During Desert Storm laser guided bombs were only 4.3% of the weapons dropped, but accounted for 75% of the damage to Iraqi infrastructure. 97 When all platforms are LGW capable, the probability of kill will go up, and the chance of collateral damage will go down. During operations in Kosovo only 20 of the estimated 23000 bombs caused any collateral damage. 98 While no collateral damage is ever good, the fact that only 20 bombs missed their mark is a testament to the precision munitions used in the conflict.
With Joint Laser Interoperability sea and ground components could reap many of these same advantages in deep operations. Naval surface combatants could use the hellfire missile or copperhead fired from ship's guns to conduct deep operations (behind the enemies lines) close to the shore with helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, UAVs, or ground teams with laser designators providing the terminal guidance. SEAL teams or UAVs could strike deeper targets by designating for a laser guided Tomahawk missile fired from surface combatants. Although this paper calls for changes in military equipment, none of these concepts are new.
Tactics, techniques, and procedures for laser designation already exist in Joint Pub 3.09.1.
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Regardless of the type of platform launching LGWs for deep operations, the platform providing terminal guidance would designate the target in accordance with the procedures already established in Joint Publication 3.09.1.
Close Operations
Joint Laser Interoperability has the potential for even greater precision advantages in close operations than it does in Interdiction. Air, land, and sea components would reap many of the same benefits available in deep operations. Laser interoperability speeds up the target acquisition process, minimizes the exposure to enemy threat systems, enables a positive handoff of enemy targets, limits collateral damage, increases the probability of a kill, and most importantly, prevents fratricide. These advantages are even more important since the majority of engagements in close operations are against the more difficult to hit small and mobile targets. Because these targets can move and shoot back, any action that speeds up the targeting process and contributes to a first round kill is beneficial to US ground forces. This section uses a National Training LGWs, and laser guided mortar rounds. In addition to the systems organic to the brigade, the unit has access to laser interoperable UAVs, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft for CAS.
As LGWs for his terminal guidance. In essence, this infantryman has a whole arsenal of LGWs at his disposal in real time that he can immediately direct against the enemy he sees. His ability to designate a target as hostile and provide terminal guidance saves time and will help prevent fratricide because he is guiding a weapon to a target he sees and not telling someone about that target in the hopes they see the same thing.
The real advantage of laser interoperability occurs when the first friendly that sees the enemy quickly provides terminal guidance for his LGWs, another platforms indirect fire LGWs, or positively passes the targets to a platform that has the killing power to destroy them. If the ground forces been on the defense and in contact with the enemy when the FAC-A arrived, they could have just as easily used the laze, spot, laze, confirm, technique to pass the targets to him.
Even in close proximity, the accuracy and small beam of the laser insures that the enemy and not friendly forces are passed between platforms. Laser interoperability works for ground to ground, air to ground, and ground to air scenarios.
For safety reasons, neither the actual nor the laser interoperable scenario used live munitions. 
LIMITATIONS
Like any military system or systems, Joint Laser Interoperability has its weak points. Some of these weaknesses are major and will limit the effectiveness of the concept, while others are less serious and can be overcome by training and innovation. Weather is the biggest problem for lasers and laser interoperability. Less serious and easier to solve are the limitations with communications and doctrine. The concept of cost has already been mentioned, and it could be the biggest roadblock to laser interoperability, however, this author believes it is worth the investment and will not cover cost as a limitation. This section deals with each limitation, and where possible, proposes a solution to minimize or negate its effect.
Lasers, and their associated aiming systems cannot see through clouds, heavy battlefield smoke, or visible moisture like rain. If the weather is between the laser and the target, a laser designator is unusable. 103 Thus
LGWs from aircraft or other platforms, which require a trajectory that enters the weather, are useless. As previously mentioned, some
LGWs have been outfitted with GPS backups that provide the weapon a less accurate precision capability for bad weather.
One option for the ground forces and helicopters that typically operate below the weather is a flat trajectory direct fire LGW. The Hellfire missile has a low trajectory option that keeps the missile from entering the weather, so this technology is available for future follow on LGWs. 104 While there is no technology that will allow lasers to work through weather, a significant portion of a joint force could still use a flat trajectory LGW on most days. Even with a flat trajectory weapon, weather remains the biggest limitation to laser systems and this problem will not be solved in the foreseeable future.
If the US makes a concerted effort to implement Joint Laser Interoperability communications will initially present a problem. Typically an aircraft or helicopter is not talking to a soldier on the ground with a laser designator unless the communication is planned in advance. Without doing a study of the entire DOD radio networks, it is not possible to point out every case where some unit may not be capable of communicating with another due to radio incompatibility.
Where issues of incompatibility arise, there will also be issues of the additional cost to provide interoperability. In addition, the laze, spot, laze, confirm technique will undoubtedly put more people on the radio nets that are compatible. This increase in radio traffic between parties who are not used to talking to each other can and will cause confusion until training and unit procedures insure the operators are proficient. On the bright side, the procedures are already in effect in Joint Pub 3.09.1. Like any new capability, units will walk before they run in the laser interoperability business. The more units train together, the more joint they will become. This problem is solvable with hard work and training.
The doctrinal limitations of laser interoperability stem from the basic tactics, techniques, and procedures required to employ lasers in combat. Laser operations can be more complicated than operations with other fire and forget or direct fire weapons. To effectively employ laser systems the operators have to know and adhere to a number of rules outlined in Joint Pub 3.09.1. The most critical rules involve a safety zone that extends +/-60 degrees from the laser designators sight line if he is lasing from a position on the ground. 105 This restriction limits available attack headings, however, violating this rule can result in a LGW guiding on a ground laser designator rather than the laser reflection off of the target. There are a number of other rules outlined in Joint Pub 3.09.1 that must be followed to insure safe laser operations. Fortunately, when the entire force is outfitted with eyesafe lasers for training, some of these restrictions will go away.
For Joint Laser Interoperability to succeed, every soldier, airman, and seaman operating on the modern battlefield must train and become proficient in laser operations. This is another limitation that training can overcome.
Overall weather is the only major limitation that cannot be overcome with hard work and 104 Joint Pub 3-09.1, III-15. 105 Ibid., commitment to Joint Laser Interoperability.
SECTION VI
CONCLUSION
If the DOD is serious about JV 2020 and its goal of precision engagement, there is much work to be done in the next 19 years. This monograph outlined the DOD's current laser systems and the precision engagement capability gained from those systems. As noted in Section II, many DOD systems have little if any precision capability. Further, current laser capabilities are certainly not joint, and several systems are not compatible within the same service. The concept of Joint Laser Interoperability offers the DOD a way to combine existing systems with a small amount of innovative new technology in order to achieve a significant precision engagement capability. This capability will make the individual services more joint in their application of combat power, and provide the precision weapons previously used by the air component to every serviceman and woman.
Precision weapons that rely solely on lasers for terminal guidance certainly have their limitations. Weather will always present a large problem for lasers, and there are those in the DOD who would abandon laser guidance because of those days when weather prevents their use.
On the other hand, there is no 100% solution in warfare. Laser systems and the LGWs they guide have built an enviable record since Desert Storm. Laser systems may not be the weapons of choice in 2050, but it is this author's opinion that they offer the best solution to a joint precision engagement capability by 2020. If lasers are not the answer in 2020, then the DOD is already behind in developing a fully joint alternative.
Should the DOD decide not to embrace this concept to modify existing aircraft and legacy forces for interoperability, it is this author's hope that these capabilities would at least be included in new systems such as the ICBT. If the DOD embraces the concept of Joint Laser Interoperability, it can provide a significant portion of JV 2020's precision engagement
